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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
J AMES H AILE III
University of Rhode Island

The Logic of Black Hole Poetics: Transnational and Transhistorical Perspectives on
Blackness
“My hole is warm and full of light. Yes, full of light,”1 Ralph Ellison quips in the Prologue of his
1952 novel, Invisible Man. A novel seemingly about not being seen, of being invisible or
transparent to those who look through or at him, shrouding him within what W. E. B. Du Bois
had termed “the color-line,”2 Ralph Ellison’s novel is not really about sight at all; rather, it is
about second sight. This is rendered in two ways. On the one hand, it is rendered in terms of a
seeming paradox: Black people are made invisible because they are constituted as hypervisible.
As Ellison himself notes, “Despite assertions by sociologists, ‘high visibility’ rendered one unvisible—whether at high noon in Macy’s window or illuminated by flaming torches and
flashbulbs while undergoing the ritual sacrifice that was dedicated to the ideal of white
supremacy.”3 What Ellison refers to as “un-visibility” is the product of the white and modern
imagination, which by sleight of hand illusion or by the mechanism of social, political, or
economic sectors renders Black life what Zakiyyah Iman Jackson referred to as “fungible.”4 That
is, Black life is seen to possess the capacity to be simultaneously anything and everything—a
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range of infinite possibilities given the specificities of circumstance and of need: at once benign
and trustworthy (as with Uncle Tom) and dangerous and foreboding (as with Mike Tyson); both
hardworking, industrious and lazy; both licentious and beyond the range of desire—making
Black life no particular thing at all, possessing no particular identity or culture.
In the same vein, R. A. Judy has gone so far as to argue, “Negro does not designate any
thing, it has no proper object; rather it indexes positioning in the order of things. This is why its
usage is always attended by the question, Where am I in relation to that position? Recall the
‘pertinent’ question asked about the Negro in Barthes’s semiological analysis of myth: What
does Negro mean as a sign in our mythology for us who are not Negro?”5
In Ellison’s novel, this no thing, or what Judy refers to as any thing, is what renders
blackness “un-visible.” Its fungibility renders it both transparent and opaque. This, though, does
not mean that Black people are nothing, or rendered a nothingness, as the first reading might
suggest. Rather, a second rendering of “un-visibility” suggests quite the opposite: no thing or any
thing suggests Black people are, in fact, every thing. In this rendering, which I would argue both
Ellison and Judy ascribe, the blackness that is assigned to and occupies Black people is a unique
purview within human consciousness—a black hole of sorts. What makes blackness such a
unique purview akin to a black hole is the idea that a black hole traps light within its
gravitational pull and its gravitational force, rendering life itself impossible. Similarly, it is
believed that blackness as the utter collapse of meaning and value and structure into a singularly
complex thing, into a specifically unspecific position, renders Black people dis-individuated—in
other words, socially dead.
However, if we were to understand black holes in a different way and understand that
black holes do not actually trap light but rather alter our perception of light—there is, in fact,
light on the other side of a black hole!6—we would need to rethink the meaning and value of
totalization, one that does negate individuality or individuation taken to be akin to said death.
Rather, we would realize that the every thing all at once, no thing or any thing inherent to the
nature of black holes and of blackness and Black life, affords us the opportunity to alter our
perception of life itself, of social and material reality itself, to understand that a shift in
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perception, a changing in the ontological order is not death, but is life itself. As Ellison tells us in
his novel, “But that (by contradiction, I mean) is how the world moves: Not like an arrow, but a
boomerang.”7 Thus, I would argue what Judy meant when he noted, “Negro does not designate
any thing, it has no proper object,” is akin to what Fred Moten calls “panthology,” that is, the
“necessity of an improvisation [a movement; a dehiscence; a quickening] of ontology for the
study of social life.”8 In other words, the gravity of black holes or the totalization of blackness
itself in fungibility is not destructive; it is a “gateways to other parts of space, or maybe even to
new universes entirely.”9No-thingness does not collapse a thing; it, in fact, sets things free.
As with all theoretical ideas, especially heuristics, there needs to be some explanation.
Blackness as a kind of black hole attuned to and by Black people is itself a bit obscure on the
face of it. However, if one takes the fundamental praxis behind the idea of the necessity of
alternate frameworks through which we can render social life as other than real, it begins to
make more sense. Much that is written of and about Black life is rendered through the lens of
white life and white normative frameworks. Within this rendering, Black life is rendered as
nonexistent—but even stronger, impossible. This is suggested in a myriad of ways, but at bottom,
it can be surmised as white life and normative ascriptions are ontologically and metaphysically
beset within the negation of the possibility of Black life itself. Although analyzing this aspect of
the phenomena that is “race,” it, nevertheless, does not really attend to Black life. For this, we
would need another lens, another framework, one that cannot be rendered through the alteration
or rearrangement of white life and white normative ascriptions. For this, we would need another
mode of engagement.
It is here, at this juncture of thinking, that we realize a second, perhaps hidden, meaning
in Ellison’s novel. Rather than merely being a novel about “un-visibility,” it is also a novel about
making oneself invisible to that “eye” that cannot see. With this rendering, we can begin to hear
Moten’s dehiscence in Ellison’s description of his hole, the panthology inherent in its
construction. “Now don’t jump to the conclusion that because I call my home a ‘hole’ it is damp
and cold like a grave,” we can hear Ellison say. “There are warm holes and there are cold holes.
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Mine is a warm hole.”10 But holes, given their nature of being built underground, do signify that,
even if they are warm, they are still dark. However, Ellison also tells us his hole is also light, in
fact, full of light. The absence of darkness in a place where we expect to find darkness, the
presence of warmth where we expect to find coldness, the presence of life where we expect to
find death—these are the elements of the dehiscence in blackness itself. It fractures our
understanding, disarticulates, cuts at its edges and at the heart with surgical precision the
ontology of time and space, history, meaning, and value—the very ontology of modernity itself.
But this is the point. A black hole, in drawing together disparate elements by its gravitational
force, reveals what it can produce: the collapsing of expectations, of time and history, concept,
and metaphor until it creates a new kind of logic—what we might call a black hole logic.
The introduction of black hole logic, then, necessitates that which can contain such
dehiscence and hold it without fracturing or collapsing its content. This is what this issue of
Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology attempts to do. This issue, organized around a singularly
and specifically unspecific position of singularity, at once challenges our understanding and
interpretation of blackness through challenging our understanding of history, of time and space,
of nation and global geography, of our social imagination and our political rendering of said
space and time. Each of the four essays comprising its content, in their own individual ways,
reflects this challenge. Each one alerts us to the ways in which “one might well add that these
configurations and transformations are exclusively in the mode of human institutions, which
delineate ranges of possible activity,” and the ways in which blackness and rethinking the gravity
and density of blackness as dehiscence directs “our desires by capturing or managing our
imagination, spawning certain types of subjects and certain practices-of-living.”11 Namely, this
issue, in reconceptualizing the possibilities inherent in blackness, reconceptualizes the very idea
of space itself, of time, and its organization, resulting in differential ways of thinking history and
its materialization in social, political, and economic landscapes.
In his essay, “The Legacy and Representation of Blacks in Spain,” Nicholas Jones
challenges contemporary historiography and literary studies by rethinking and reimagining the
presence of Black people in the Iberian Peninsula, specifically Spain. Rather than
conceptualizing Spain as “hybrid, a culture that was produced over the course of centuries by the
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intermixing of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish populations and traditions,” Jones’s essay argues
that in Spain, “Blackness is unbounded by the confines of temporality,” and what is more, “antiBlack racism and ideologies have systematically worked to mute and suppress the visibility of
African-descended people across the globe.” Part of a larger book, Staging Habla de Negros:
Radical Performances of the African Diaspora in Early Modern Spain (2019), Jones’s essay
argues that although “necrocapitalism, or the business of death” facilitates said “disappearance,”
“Iberian Blackness as a cultural, linguistic, literary, and lived mode of existence” nonetheless has
resisted such erasure.
At bottom, Jones’s essay is about the critical praxis of the imagination: How is blackness
imaged? How do Black people imagine themselves? How would thinking through Black selffashioning change the historical and sociological imagination of blackness in the contemporary
world and, thus, how we imagine blackness to have existed in the past?
Manuela Boatcă’s essay, “Counter-Mapping as Method: Locating and Relating the
(Semi)Peripheral Self,” is concerned with narrativity, reflexivity, and sociological method as
decolonial practice—what is remembered, how it is recorded, what is “forgotten” in the
production of knowledge, and how remapping the world (conceptually and literally) reshapes
what is remembered and how it is remembered. Utilizing Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de
Sousa Santos’s term sociology of absences—namely, the argument that “aims to explain that
what does not exist is in fact actively produced as nonexistent”—Boatcă’s essay argues that, in
addition to a sociology of absences, what is needed is a sociology of emergences in which such
“alternatives [as presented in the sociology of absences]” contain “the horizon of concrete
possibilities.” Boatcă argues that “both the sociology of absences and the sociology of
emergences become necessary in order to incorporate past and present experiences of the
colonized world into general social theory and build collective global futures.”
Similar to Nicholas Jones’s essay, Boatcă’s essay is about the imagination as critical
praxis—that is, how we think about and see the world influences the ways in which the world as
such emerges in concrete fashion. Utilizing “counter-mapping as a means to address the silences
and absences produced through maps grounded in the Western political tradition of a territorial
norm and a settled subject,” Boatcă’s essay argues that how we conceive of space shapes the way
we conceive of place and time, ultimately influencing the ways in which we think about concepts
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such as nationhood, nationality, citizenship, and migration: central issues around who does and
who does not belong as legal and illegal persons, respectively.
As Jones’s essay seeks to discover how Black people have been left out or erased from
the Iberian social imagination, Boatcă’s essay seeks to understand how mapmaking or
cartography reflects the ways in which Black and Brown people are erased from the “territory”
itself through practices of map or world making. Taken together as conceptual companion
pieces, Jones’s and Boatcă’s essays create a kind of critical convergence of Moten’s
dehiscence—a breaking into that not only reveals the already existing fracturing taking place
within consciousness, and in the material world, but also produces such fracturing as counterknowledge production.
Falguni Sheth’s essay, “Liberalism’s Scrim: A Genealogy of ‘American’ Violence,”
offers an interesting meta-reflection on the Jones and Boatcă essays. As a critical evaluation of
state-sanctioned violence on human persons through an investigation of what Jones termed
necropolitics specifically targeting Black people, Sheth’s essay offers a kind of prolegomena for
the pitfalls of liberalism through black theory.
Sheth’s essay is an example of Black studies, and what Black studies can offer in the
realm of critique that traditional (white) theory occludes, either intentionally or unintentionally
(as the previously mentioned essays have shown). For Sheth, Black studies can point out in stark
clarity some of the internal problematics to liberalism itself: that is, at once valuing white life
and mourning its loss, while on the other hand, or even on the same hand, disavowing white life
and white value in the face of, perhaps, even whiter values, as the various school shooting have
shown. Sheth’s essay points out that this conflict is internal to liberalism itself. It is not just that
Black life does not matter, but at a certain level all life becomes abstract and abstracted, and it is
Black life that throws this reality into relief. That is, it is Black life itself and its place within the
order of things that makes it clear how all life is enacted at the level of the state apparatus. Sheth
suggests that the Parkland shooting revealed “liberal discourses of neutrality and justice are
systematically linked to selective violence against certain marginal populations by dominant
populations,” a violence that can and is transferrable to all human populations in state-sanctioned
violence.
It is in this way that Sheth’s essay is a grand example of the power of Black theory, but it
also works as a metatheory and a meditation on the lessons of Jones’s and Boatcă’s essays—the
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dehiscence present within historical erasures and in the cartographical erasures, reflecting a
larger theoretical apparatus in which blackness is at once fungible, yet this fungibility is not its
death cycle, but its capacity to resist, rethink, and rename the world.
Lastly, Michael Sawyer’s essay, “Toni Morrison’s Trans-Subjective and TransGenerational Phenomenology of Temporality,” offers a great closing to this small collection. An
essay fully immersed in the work of Toni Morrison, Sawyer at once lands us within the realm of
Morrison’s “fully evolved philosophical system,” and also eloquently allows us to remain within
our contemporary and historical worlds and imaginations to consider the ways in which “Black
Life under the coercive threat of white supremacy, while, at the same time, illuminating the
manner in which that seemingly totalizing way of being is to be breached.” We began this
introduction thinking about Ellison and about Du Bois, roaming through Fred Moten’s
panthology and the fungibility articulated by Zakiyyah Jackson, ending with Judy’s insistence
that “Negro does not designate any thing, it has no proper object; rather it indexes positioning in
the order of things.” Sawyer’s essay allows us, through Morrison, to tarry with the “existence of
this ‘third, if you will pardon the expression, world,’ in excess of the Black/white world binary
that serves as the dialectical imperative,” as a “point of departure as well as the goal” to begin to
think but also to remember what has already been thought: to move through the historiography
as Jones does; to move through both the sociology of absences and emergences as Boatcă does;
to sit with the implications of Black theory as Sheth does. Sawyer leaves us with a generative
and parting gift:
to explore … a comprehensive series of topics that broadly seem to fall into the following
categories:
•

Temporality/Genealogy

•

Sex(uality)

•

Gender

•

Freedom

•

Human/Animal Binary

•

Spatiality/Place-iality

•

Language
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In the moment we are in, everyone, from corporate entities to individual lay persons, is
motivated by the idea of the significance of Black life, centered around the phrase “Black Lives
Matter.” With all the literary and academic works being produced at this time, capturing the
zeitgeist of the moment, this journal issue included, we are invited, the writers and thinkers in
this journal before you, to think about what it means to matter in a philosophical, literary,
sociological, cartographical, nationalistic, and human sense of the term. What would it mean for
Black life to matter? What would have to change about our world (its memory, its organizational
structure, its undercurrent assumptions) for this to not be just another moment of consumption in
which Black people are turned into a commodity to be consumed like meat or just flesh? What
would we have to consider about blackness and about how we’ve conceptualized life itself to, as
Sawyer has suggested, “destabilize … the normalization of the abjection of some subject vis-àvis the other arguing that the terms of the inversion are the extension of dialectical abjection into
his third (inverted) world”? It would be more than banners and slogans and the saying of names.
It would be in the building of worlds. I hope that, as Duquesne University Press publishes this,
the university also investigates its own hiring practices, the ways it recruits and engages Black
persons outside of the playing courts and fields, the ways it engages the extant Black
communities surrounding it, especially those that are displaced within the jails it overlooks next
to the beautiful and winding Monongahela River. I would hope, as has been told to me by the
university itself, that it would not take this as another moment of capitalization, but would take
this as a moment of critical reflection in which to think means to act.
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